One in five Americans calls Texas or California home. By one in four will. Over the past 20 years the two states have created a third of new jobs in America. California would be fifth, right behind Germany. Both states were early to become majority-minority.
In California non-whites have outnumbered whites since , and in Texas since The rest of the country is not expected to reach this threshold until the middle of the century. California and Texas educate nearly a quarter of American children, many of them poor and non-native English-speakers. At first glance the two states seem as different as a quinoa burger and beef brisket. California is a one-party state in which elected Republicans may soon need the kind of protection afforded to the bighorn sheep. In Texas Republicans dominate the state legislature and all the statewide executive offices: no Democrat has won a statewide race there for more than 20 years.
The last Democratic presidential candidate to do so was elected over 40 years ago. Texas has no state income tax.
Texas has loose environmental regulations. California is trying to use its economic might to force the rest of the country to adopt more stringent standards on carbon-dioxide emissions. Texas lets its cities sprawl; California has restrictive planning laws. Take a closer look, though, and Texas looks more like a teenage California. The population of Texas has only recently reached the level California was at in the late s.
The Golden State was once a pro-sprawl, low-tax, Republican state, too. In the Texas legislative session which ended last month, politicians focused less on abortion and bathrooms for transgender people, and instead increased funding for public schools.
Stroud ; Grundmann Aside from concerns about empirical plausibility, it is important to note that Cartesian dream skepticism depends on even more basic background assumptions.
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In particular, it assumes that dreams are deceptive, first, because they are conscious experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from standard waking experiences and second, because they involve false beliefs. One strategy for refuting Cartesian dream skepticism in the newer literature has been to question these assumptions and deny either that dreams are experiences at all Malcolm , or that they are deceptive in the ways envisioned by Descartes. A common strategy is to allow that dreams are experiences but deny either that they involve false percepts or that they involve false sensory-based beliefs, or both Ichikawa ; see section 2.
For this reason, the epistemological problem of dream skepticism is both historically and systematically related to newer treatments of dreaming in philosophy of mind. Malcolm argues that attempts to conceive of dreams as experiences during sleep are senseless and that dreams consequently provide no foothold for philosophical skepticism. On this view, external-world skepticism motivated by dreaming can be refuted by defending internal-world skepticism about the experiential status of dreaming.
Malcolm It follows that retrospective dream reports are the sole criterion for determining whether a dream occurred and that there is no independent way of verifying the occurrence of dreams in sleep. According to Malcolm, dream reports and waking memory reports are governed by different grammars and it would be mistaken to infer that an identity of experience lies behind them:.
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If a man had certain thoughts and feelings in a dream it no more follows that he had those thoughts and feelings while asleep, than it follows from his having climbed a mountain in a dream that he climbed a mountain while asleep. On this view, dream thoughts and feelings do not count as thoughts and feelings at all. For the same reason, it is impossible to mistakenly think, judge or assert that one is now awake while in fact one is dreaming Malcolm While Malcolm seems to be saying that conscious experience is conceptually tied to wakefulness, he later claims that speaking of dreams as conscious experiences is unintelligible:.
If having experiences in sleep involves having thoughts, impressions, beliefs etc.
An important consequence of this view is that because dream reports, for Malcolm, are the sole criterion of dreaming, there can be no additional observational evidence for saying that a person is now asleep and dreaming. According to Malcolm, contemporaneous evidence such as sleepwalking or sleeptalking could not count as evidence for saying that dreams are experiences occurring during deep sleep, because they would show that the person in question was at least partially awake.
Similarly, any attempts to adopt a physiological criterion of dreaming such as EEG measures of brain activity during sleep would change the concept of dreaming. Hence, according to Malcolm, empirical evidence is irrelevant for the study of dreaming and attempts to study dreams scientifically are misconceived. Putnam : It does not imply that nothing goes on in our minds while we dream. Nagel If we do not, then there is no longer an obvious contradiction involved in saying that one has thoughts, feelings or beliefs—or perhaps even experiences—while asleep and dreaming. This should alert us to the fact that purely conceptual arguments of the type proposed by Malcolm do not, on their own, prohibit the application of such mental state terms to dreaming Windt To the extent that they do, this is a mere conceptual stipulation and not really informative for an interdisciplinary investigation of dreaming.
Rather, whether dream thoughts, feelings or beliefs are sufficiently similar to waking ones to count as real instances of their kind is an open question.
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Dennett What these have in common is that is that they are phenomenal states: there is something it is like to be in these states for the subject of experience cf. Asking about dream experience, then, is to ask whether it is like something to dream while one is dreaming, and whether what it is like is similar to or relevantly different from corresponding waking experiences. Note that these are two different questions: It might be like something to dream and dreams might be experiences in this very general sense , though what it is like to dream might still be different from standard waking experience.
If so, dreams might count as experiences even if they do not involve actual instances of sensations, emotions etc. A second important objection to the view that dreams are conscious experiences during sleep is the claim that it relies on insufficient empirical evidence or is even empirically implausible. A particularly prominent version of this objection is to say that dreams lack temporal extension: dreams are instantaneous memory insertions occurring at the moment of awakening.
The cassette theory says that dreams are the product of two processes: a composition process responsible for the composition of dream narratives during sleep and a memory-loading process responsible for the ability to recall the dream upon awakening. Importantly, the only difference between the received view and the cassette theory is that the former additionally posits a conscious presentation process during sleep.
On the received view, it is like something to dream; on the cassette theory, it is only like something to recall dreams. Both theories, however, are supposed to deal equally well with the available empirical evidence, for instance on the relationship between dreaming and REM sleep. The important point, for Dennett, is that it is impossible to distinguish between the two rival theories on the basis of dream recall.
In Consciousness Explained , Dennett uses a similar thought experiment to undermine the distinction between memory insertion and memory revision for waking memory reports see also Emmett for a critical discussion of this point. At this point, Maury awoke to find that the headboard of his bed had fallen on his neck.
Because the dream seemed to systematically build up to its dramatic climax, which in turn was occasioned, it would seem, by an external stimulus, he and others suggested that such cases were best explained as instantaneous memory insertions experienced at the moment of awakening.
This theory, also known as the Goblot-hypothesis, was discussed by many dream researchers, such as Binz , Goblot , Freud , and more recently Hall ; for a discussion from the perspective of contemporary dream research, see Kramer 22— It also continues to be discussed in the contemporary literature.
Rosen argues that dreams are experiences, but at the same time proposes that Malcolm and Dennett were right to raise skeptical worries about the trustworthiness of dream reports. Her narrative fabrication thesis says that dream reports are in fact often the product of confabulation and fail to accurately describe experiences occurring during sleep.
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By contrast, Windt defends an anti-skeptical view according to which dream reports can, at least under certain conditions, be regarded as trustworthy with respect to previous experience during sleep. Whereas Dennett takes the empirical evidence to be insufficient for deciding the question of whether dreams are experiences, more recent authors Flanagan ; Metzinger ; Revonsuo ; Rosen ; Windt suggest otherwise. A first reason for thinking that dreams are experiences during sleep is the relationship between dreaming and REM rapid eye movement sleep.
This latter activity is in fact indistinguishable, using EEG measures alone, from measures obtained during wakefulness. REM sleep is also characterized by rapid eye movements and a near-complete loss of muscle tone. Further characteristics of REM sleep include increased blood pressure, respiratory rate and pupil diameter as well as irregular heart rate for details, see Dement 27—50; Jouvet Because of this combination of wake-like brain activity and peripheral paralysis, REM sleep is sometimes also called paradoxical sleep Jouvet Importantly, reports of dreaming are much more frequent following REM sleep awakenings The former tend to be more elaborate, vivid, and emotionally intense, whereas the latter tend to be more thought-like, confused, non-progressive and repetitive Hobson et al.
Yet, attempts to identify dreaming with mental activity during REM sleep are controversial, and many now hold that dreams can occur in all stages of sleep e. The controversy about the sleep-stage correlates of dreaming is further complicated by the fact that there is currently no standardized and widely accepted definition of dreaming Pagel et al. It thus seems plausible that.
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Nielsen A more differentiated picture of brain activity during sleep and its relation to dreaming is suggested by neuroimaging studies, which show that REM sleep is characterized by a shift in regional activation patterns compared to both wakefulness and NREM sleep Dang-Vu et al. High activation levels in the pons, thalamus, temporo-occipital, motor, limbic, and paralimbic areas including the amygdala , equaling or even surpassing those seen in wakefulness, fit in well with the predominance of visual and motor imagery during dreams and with the frequency of intense, often negative emotions.
The comparative deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices fits in well with the cognitive deficits often thought to characterize dreaming such as the loss of self-awareness, the absence of critical thinking, mnemonic deficits and the delusional belief in the reality of dream events Hobson et al. This convergence of neuroscientific evidence and the phenomenology of dreaming thus suggests the outlines of a naturalistic theory of dreaming.
And if we follow Dennett in thinking that this kind of evidence is relevant for determining whether dream sensations and emotions are real instances of their kind, then this is a compelling reason for saying that dreams are, after all, experiences, in the sense of involving the phenomenology of seeing, feeling, etc during sleep.
A second line of evidence comes from lucid dreams, or dreams in which one knows that one is dreaming and is often able to exercise some level of dream control LaBerge The term lucid dreaming was coined by van Eeden , but the phenomenon has been known for centuries. Aristotle On Dreams already notes that one can sometimes be aware, while dreaming, that one is dreaming. Yet, many theorists, including many philosophers e.